Alexandre Popovic, The Revolt of African Slaves in Iraq in the 3rd/9th Century (1976/1998)

The reason I read this is that it is, apparently, the best account of the Zanj Rebellion, the massive, 14-year long uprising of African slaves in ninth century Iraq. These slaves may have worked on plantations, even on sugar-growing plantations. So, ultimately, my interest was to learn more about the development of the "plantation complex," which of course would play such a big role in the colonization of the Americas. This book is considered important - it was published by an imprint of Princeton University Press; Henry Louis Gates wrote an introduction to the English translation; on the back cover, David Brion Davis, the eminent historian of slavery, blurbs it as "an extremely important book." Yet the book is also quite underwhelming. This is no reflection on the author. An immigrant to France from Tito's Jugoslavia, Popovic began work on the project in 1957, and after eight years completed his research. The French edition came out in 1976. My hunch is that simply collecting the relatively sparse evidence on the Rebellion was a painstaking task in and of itself. The work is underwhelming because it amounts largely to a literal blow-by-blow account of the long rebellion. There is very little analysis here, which the author acknowledges. The whole text amounts to fewer than 160 pages, including footnotes. The closest Popovic comes to addressing the question that most interests me - about the nature of the slavery - is when he discusses the conditions in southern Iraq, especially around Basra. There was lots of unclaimed "dead land" - which farmers had abandoned to move to the cities, and which has become covered in a layer of salt. The government offered incentives to whomever was willing to reclaim the dead land and put it to use. Basra was the center of capital looking for opportunities and a major slave market. So, while Popovic uses the term "plantations" only once, all of the ingredients seemed to be in place for plantation-style slavery. Sugarcane, I believe, had already made its way from India, where it was domesticated, to the Fertile Crescent. Popovic suggests, albeit only in passing, that the Zanj Rebellion may have put an end to the development of plantations in the Abbasid world. Only when European crusaders appeared on the scene would the plantation complex be revived and begin its fateful movement across the Mediterranean, onto the Atlantic islands (Canaries, Sao Thome), and then into the New World.

Harvey Mansfield, The Rise and Fall of Rational Control: The History of Modern Political Philosophy (2025)

This was a challenging book to read, and now to write about. Mansfield gives a very close reading to eight thinkers of what he calls "rational control:" Machiavelli, who initiated modern political theory; Hobbes; Locke; Rousseau; Kant; Hegel; Marx; and Nietzsche. I often found myself struggling to follow Mansfield's interpretations. Partly, perhaps, this was because I simply knew much less about most of these thinkers than I had assumed. Partly, perhaps, because Mansfield, a Straussian, offered idiosyncratic takes, at least some of the time - but when? (Straussians posit the ability to decipher hidden meanings in the great works, which speak to each other, but not to the common man). And partly, finally, because Mansfield sometimes didn't explain key terms and assumptions sufficiently clearly, at least for my taste. For example, what was the ancient and medieval thinking that Machiavelli was rejecting? Eventually, Mansfield mentions virtue (including justice and nobility), natural law, and God. And what does rational control mean, exactly? Often, Mansfield set this idea aside and focused on apparently related ideas, such as "necessity" (in the case of Machiavelli) - without explicating the connection. Necessity, it seems, means self-preservation. I don't know whether other political philosophers would agree that Machiavelli is as pivotal as Mansfield makes out. Or for the reasons Mansfield gives. I wish I'd taken Mansfield's course, which provides the basis for the book, when I was an undergrad and had the chance to discuss the ideas in section. Even better, I wish I'd first taken his complementary course on ancient and medieval political thought. (Of course, as an undergrad, I'd be even less prepared to follow his argument than now.) One of the truly new ideas for me was Mansfield's argument that Rousseau - not Hegel - had historicized reason. At the end of the book, Mansfield surprised me. I thought he might argue for a return to the ancient emphasis on virtue. But instead he suggests we need a "reworked liberalism," one that emphasizes individual honor rather than materal accumulation.

Thomas Piketty and Michael Sandel, Equality: What It Means and Why It Matters (2025)

This slim book (115 pages), which I read for my Zoom book club, is a transcript of a conversation between the two famous authors. It was illuminating, and I liked a lot of what they (especially Sandel) proposed, but I wished they had explored their areas of difference more actively. Picketty is pushing for a reinvigorated, again radical Social Democracy, which will restore a much more progressive tax regime, "decommodify" as much as 80-90% of the economy, and promote much greater North-South international cooperation and even, one day, establish a United States of the World. Sandel emphasized ways to take the sting out of meritocracy - for example, by introducing chance (through lotteries) in selection for top colleges, and by honoring all work. While the two men generally signalled their agreement with each other, the reader unfortunately didn't learn much about potential conflicts between their approaches. Picketty, for example, seems to think we need a much larger share of the population earning a college/university degree, while Sandel seems to want to devalue the credential of a college degree. Sandel's communitarianism seems to entail greater subsidiarity - smaller-scale communities being given more responsibility and strengthened - which would seem to be at odds with Picketty's socialist dream of a world community and government. Finally, Sandel calls for a more judgmental kind of political conversation and community, one that is willing to identify better and worse ways of life. But, I wonder, wouldn't this judgmentalism fuel the flames of populist resentment toward elites?

Jonathan Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585-1740 (1989)

This excellent book has helped to fill in several gaps in my knowledge - about the Dutch Republic, early modern trade, European great power competition, the tools and changing nature of mercantilism. I knew of Israel as an intellectual historian of the Enlightenment, but before coming across this book, I had no idea that he had previously focused on economic and political history, a field in which he achieved great distinction. Israel challenges a number of dominant accounts of Dutch economic success in the early modern period. He disputes Fernand Braudel's claims that population and economic trends and Dutch advantages in "bulk" trades alone accounted for the Dutch Republic's economic rise and fall. Rather, politics - above all, the role of the "federal republican" Dutch state - was also crucial. Additionally, the Dutch expanded beyond the bulk trades, whose success depended on extraordinarily low shipping costs and low interest rates, to become dominant in the rich trades as well. In order to do this, they had to develop processing, refining, and manufacturing capabilities. Israel convincingly argues that the Dutch Republic's global trade primacy was predicated on something never seen before in the world: its role as an active global entrepot. Previously, Antwerp had been a global entrepot, but it had functioned more passively, as a conduit. The Dutch used both state power (elbowing Antwerp aside, forging alliances, cornering markets) and value-adding manufacturing to make themselves an active global entrepot. The book helped me understand better, though by no means fully, how mercantilism worked and evolved. The decades between 1720 and 1740 were a turning point, as a previously gentler mercantilism gave way to a "comprehensive, industrial mercantilism." Across the board, countries banned the export of raw materials and the import of finished products from other powers, with the intent to build up their own industries. Why, exactly, this change occurred now was unclear to me. Israel mentions intensified competition, but what was responsible for this? After all, competition had appeared to be quite fierce earlier - between Spain and the North Netherland; Spain and England; England and the Dutch Republic; the Dutch Republic and Denmark; the Dutch Republic and Sweden; France under Louis XIV and many countries. What was new in the early 18th century - was it a significantly strengthened England/Britain after 1688? Newly ambitious powers, like Prussia under Friedrich Wilhelm I and Russia under Peter? Greater state capacity in many places? Questions for another day.... Reading this book makes me all the more eager to read more about the Dutch and the early modern period. Stay tuned.

T.S. Eliot, The Waste Land and Other Poems (1930)

A departure for me, yes. A welcome one. I'd periodically come across comments referring to Eliot's towering influence in mid-century American high culture. I wanted to know more. So my colleague and friend Ezra Nielsen lent me this slim volume. I loved it. I admit I know nothing about how to read poetry. It was a chastening experience to feel lost at sea. But Ezra gave me some tips about the content - the sense of brokenness of the world (my words, not his) - and recommended I read the poems out loud and relish the words. Which I did. I plan to read them several times more.

Gustav Peebles with Benjamin Luzzatto, The First and Last Bank: Climate Change, Currency and a New Carbon Commons (2025)

I am so glad I read this book. Ever since the fall, when I had purchased it at a book launch, I had been meaning to read it. Partly, this was from a sense of obligation. Gustav is a friend - his son Soren and my son Sammy have been best friends since before they could walk. But I was also interested in the topic of the book. For years, I had heard Gustav, who is an economic anthropologist, talking about the project, in particular about the role of “hoards” (which, I admit, I hadn't fully grasped). Though I like to think know something about economics, there is still much I have to learn. I thought Gustav’s anthropological take on economics might be quite different than the more standard fare I was familiar with But I had no idea just how interesting and impressive the book would prove to be. First of all, intellectually, the book’s argument ties together several different fields: currency and banking, commons-based management, climate change, and finally Indigenous and religious wisdom. The result is an original and, in my eyes, persuasive argument. Peebles and Luzzatto propose that carbon be drawn out of the atmosphere (“sky-mined”) and turned into a solid, with the resulting “biochar” serving as the the monetary base/reserves (or “hoard”) of a new currency. They explore the gold standard as a “beta test” for the carbon-backed currency they propose. More generally, they skillfully draw on wide-ranging instances of currency creation and management from around the globe and across time to suggest that, and how, this would work. An essential part of their plan would be that the banks hoarding the biochar and issuing chits upon it would be run as cooperatives - here, too, they look to the extensive literature on “managing the commons” (Elinor Ostrom) to defend and explicate their proposal. So, the basic idea is ingenious, and the reasoning seemed to me very careful and persuasive (admittedly, I am a neophyte in these areas). The main exception I would make is Gustav’s recurring appeals to mysticism and various Gaia-like descriptions of nature as a holistic system. But that’s a minor quibble, and I believe the rest of the argument can stand on its own, without the mysticism. A second thing that impressed me very much was the book’s politics, which are simultaneously bold, creative, and pragmatic. Gustav laments that governments and corporations have woefully failed to address the climate crisis. However, rather than cursing the darkness, Gustav lights a candle, laying out a plan for concerned citizens to take action themselves. His biochar-backed currency would not replace governmental legal tender, but would be a complementary currency (something quite common in history). The cooperative banks would rely on, while also invigorating, that currently somewhat dormant resource, community. Peebles and Luzzatto propose bold reforms, but they repeatedly acknowledge that they don’t have all the answers and that much will be learned only after their carbon currency has been tried out. Their hearts are with the left, but they (gently) urge doctrinaire leftists to think more flexibly and pragmatically. Namely, one shouldn’t leave it at cursing banks, but should turn their power to the advantage of nature and community. As the authors put it, we must “use judo on banking.” Finally, the writing is clear and accessible. At times, it’s elegiac, at times slyly humorous. In short, I was consistently engaged. Ben Luzzatto’s illustrations enrich the text with an alternative, complementary way to imagine a different future. This is an original, well-supported, and potentially quite important book.

Victor Lieberman, Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800-1830. Volume 1: Integration on the Mainland (2003)

My injured right arm will keep this review brief. I thoroughly enjoyed this book and am planning on reading vol. 2 very soon. Lieberman is a historian of Burma, but has read very widely, not just about the two other sectors of mainland southeast Asia, what eventually became Thailand and Vietnam. He's also conversant with many other historiographies and social sciences. He skillfully and persuasively situates this work against the backdrop of several generations of work on the region. Lieberman is masterful at coralling oodles of details into discernible patterns; he acknowledges exceptions, while still identifying trends. I was sometimes reminded of Weber (which my loyal readers will know is a very great compliment, indeed). Lieberman's theme is the long-term, not linear, but "ratchet-like," integration of economic relations, culture, and power in each of the three zones. He ascribes these integrative trends to multiple factors, including climatic conditions, interstate warfare, Theravada Buddhism (in the cases of Burma and Thailand) and Neo-Confucianism and Chinese models of governance (in Vietnam). In vol. 2, Lieberman casts an even bigger net, arguing that these southeast Asian trends paralleled developments in other parts of Eurasia. I believe that this southeast Asian specialist will add an interesting perspective - and perhaps correctives - to the Eurocentric and Sinocentric authors I'm familiar with.