Frederick C. Beiser, The German Historicist Tradition (2011)

I read this for my project on historical methodology. In fact, I'd read it several years ago, but I'd forgotten the contents nearly completely, and it seemed to fit with my current focus within the project, i.e. understanding how and why the study of human history parted ways with other historical sciences (geology, paleontology, archeology, anthropology) in terms of methodology. Beiser seems to know the topic quite deeply and his judgments seem persuasive. What I came away thinking was that the earliest historicists - Chladenius, Moeser, Herder, Humboldt - all seemed open, or even committed, to the 18th century idea of a naturalistic "science of man." This was particularly true of the last two thinkers. At the same time, compared to Scots like Smith and Hume, and Frenchmen like Montesquieu, Rousseau or Condillac, the Germans were simultaneously wrestling with heavy-duty philosophical questions - about individuality, free will, and providence in history, for example. The enormous (and in my eyes disastrous) influence of Ranke from the 1830s on cannot be explained by the originality or persuasiveness of his ideas. Ranke is the first historicist who fully rejects naturalism and seeks to establish history in a way fundamentally distinct from the natural sciences. He emphasizes the importance of source criticism - this is to provide the scientific certainty of history. However, source criticism had been around for some time, originating in the Renaissance with men like Lorenzo Valla and Agricola, and in Germany being promoted in the 18th century at the University of Goettingen. My argument might be that source criticism didn't become the rallying cry of history in the 18th century, say, because a more naturalistic science of man was still being considered. Once that is dropped - because it would require unacceptable compromises when it came to philosophical ideas about individuality, free will, and providence - source criticism comes to seem especially appealing as an adequate source of scientificness. (Alas, it really isn't!). At least, this is one of the reasons. Another might be that the naturalistic science of man became associated with Hegel's teleological and procrustean account, something historians found distasteful for several reasons. No doubt I will have to return to this book when I am ready to return to writing.

Harvey Mansfield, The Rise and Fall of Rational Control: The History of Modern Political Philosophy (2025)

This was a challenging book to read, and now to write about. Mansfield gives a very close reading to eight thinkers of what he calls "rational control:" Machiavelli, who initiated modern political theory; Hobbes; Locke; Rousseau; Kant; Hegel; Marx; and Nietzsche. I often found myself struggling to follow Mansfield's interpretations. Partly, perhaps, this was because I simply knew much less about most of these thinkers than I had assumed. Partly, perhaps, because Mansfield, a Straussian, offered idiosyncratic takes, at least some of the time - but when? (Straussians posit the ability to decipher hidden meanings in the great works, which speak to each other, but not to the common man). And partly, finally, because Mansfield sometimes didn't explain key terms and assumptions sufficiently clearly, at least for my taste. For example, what was the ancient and medieval thinking that Machiavelli was rejecting? Eventually, Mansfield mentions virtue (including justice and nobility), natural law, and God. And what does rational control mean, exactly? Often, Mansfield set this idea aside and focused on apparently related ideas, such as "necessity" (in the case of Machiavelli) - without explicating the connection. Necessity, it seems, means self-preservation. I don't know whether other political philosophers would agree that Machiavelli is as pivotal as Mansfield makes out. Or for the reasons Mansfield gives. I wish I'd taken Mansfield's course, which provides the basis for the book, when I was an undergrad and had the chance to discuss the ideas in section. Even better, I wish I'd first taken his complementary course on ancient and medieval political thought. (Of course, as an undergrad, I'd be even less prepared to follow his argument than now.) One of the truly new ideas for me was Mansfield's argument that Rousseau - not Hegel - had historicized reason. At the end of the book, Mansfield surprised me. I thought he might argue for a return to the ancient emphasis on virtue. But instead he suggests we need a "reworked liberalism," one that emphasizes individual honor rather than materal accumulation.