Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806 (1995)

Despite having studied European history for many, many years, I knew embarrassingly little about the Dutch Republic in the early modern period. I had a vague sense that it had developed in parallel with early modern England in many respects: as constitutional polity, highly commercialized economy, global trading and colonial power, and pioneer of religious toleration. In many of these respects, I thought it was somehow even more advanced than its cross-Channel neighbor. And I knew that William and Mary of Holland had become king and queen during the English Glorious Revolution of 1688-9. But while I knew a fair amount about 17th century England leading up to 1688, I really had no idea of the backstory to the Dutch Republic's modernity. I didn't know, for example, why what I took to be the Dutch monarch was called the Stadholder. With these motivations, and after having appreciated Israel's book on Dutch trade (Dutch Primacy in World Trade), I turned to this highly praised book. I can't claim that I read every single one of its 1130 pages, but I read most of the pages on the nation's rise and greatness. I knew from the previous book of Israel's that I had read that he rejected purely materialist accounts of historical change (a la Braudel or Marx). Nonetheless, he acknowledges the importance of these underlying conditions and begins his account with some fundamental distinctions between the Low Countries north and south of the rivers (Rhine and Maas) that became pronounced during the 14th century. To the north, there was one large historical state (Holland), in which there was a wide urbanization. In the south, there were two states (Brabant and Flanders), in both of which a few larger cities predominated. My main interest was in the political evolution of the Dutch Republic. It's a bewilderingly complex tale, involving partly self-governing, increasingly commercial cities; regions (Holland) embedded in larger entities (once the revolt against Spain starts, the Union of Utrecht, 1579; the Holy Roman Empire); dynastic holdings (Burgundian, Habsburger); religious tensions (between Catholicism and Reformed Churches, later between different tendences within the Reformed, and also a smattering of Lutherans and Mennonites), etc. The Stadholder or Stadholders were counts or governors of, to begin with, the dynasties and, later, independent governors of regions (Holland, Friesland, etc.) Often several of the regions had the same Stadholder. For much of the period the Stadholders were from the House of Orange, whose ancestral seat was in southern France (talk about confusing!). A second powerful position, sometimes working in concert with the Stadholders, but also at times in opposition, were Advocates or Pensioneers of the single largest state in the north, Holland. Throughout the period, but especially once the Dutch Revolt against Habsburg Spain starts (1572), great power politics is a constant concern - the Dutch against or with Spain, France, England, various principalities along the Rhine, etc. The basic story of how the Dutch established themselves as a republic fits with Mancur Olson's argument: a contest for domination ended in stalemate and, ultimately, compromise. The two parties were the Orangists (Stadholder - who at times became somewhat monarchical, but also at times enjoyed more popular support) and states party (Advocates/Pensioneers of Holland). The contest started earlier than in England (late 16th century), but compromise was only achieved at roughly the same time (1680s). Two tidbits that illustrate the efficacy and modernity of this society: in 1670, Amsterdam was the first city in the world to introduce public street lights. And the 1688 invasion of England, involving 20,000 troops and 500 ships, was the most impressive logistical feat of any early modern state. I'm deeply impressed by Israel's mastery of such a complex story. Nonetheless, his "seamless" telling of this story is grist for the mill of my argument that historians need more social science discipline (an argument I hope to make and publish down the road).