Allen Buchanan, Our Moral Fate: Evolution and the Escape from Tribalism (2020)

This is an amazingly stimulating book - speculative, to be sure, as the author admits, but fascinating and, in my eyes, fairly persuasive. Buchanan starts with an important and largely overlooked puzzle: how to explain what he calls two Great Expansions in human moral sensibilities in at least parts of the world in the last three centuries. First, some people overcame the default stance of moral tribalism - only "we" are fully human and hence deserving of the highest moral standing - and began to think and act as if all humans qua humans deserved that standing. Second, some people extended the idea of rights to include some non-human animals. Buchanan acknowlegdes that some other scholars have tried to explain the First Great Expansion, but he makes the case that their answers are not persuasive, and suggests that nobody has even tried to explain the Second Great Expansion. Buchanan's puzzle seems like a genuine and quite important one. Buchanan argues that these Great Expansions are incompatible with two dogmas among the evolutionary thinkers he otherwise draws on: the dogma of tribalism, i.e. humans are naturally and ineluctably tribalistic; and the dogma of cooperation, i.e. morality is only a matter of facilitating cooperation. A key idea for Buchanan is that human morality is shaped both by our genetic inheritance but also by our social environment. Furthermore, we are niche constructors - at least partly, we make the world to which our moralities respond. Our moralities are "adaptively plastic" - in environments where tribalism is the safer bet, we will be tribalistic. But when the social environment changes - when we create safer and richer niches, for example - our morality has the room to change and become less or non-tribalistic. For Buchanan's purposes, the historical rise of the state and of markets created the conditions in which non-tribalistic moralities became possible. However, on Buchanan's account, this new niche only opened the door to the Two Great Expansions. Something more was required for people to walk through the door. Here's where he emphasizes the importance of moral consistency reasoning and moral identity. The former meant that people might expand the circle of their moral regard, first to all other people, and then to some animals. The central importance of moral identity - a term new to me, and seemingly quite promising - is in motivating people to become morally consistent. Toward the end of the book, Buchanan suggests how ideology can short-circuit the expansive power of moral consistency reasoning and moral identity and instead shore up the defenses of resurgent tribalism - as we are seeing now.

Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Conceptualizing Capitalism: Institutions, Evolution, Future (2015)

This book is somewhat challenging to comment on. I found many parts quite interesting, but I don't think it ranks up there - for me, at least - as a great book. Hodgson knows a lot about many things - and he comments smartly on many debates - but at times I lost sight of what he cared most about. Or why those things mattered. For example, as his title suggests, Hodgson insists that getting the definition of capitalism right is of great importance. Conceptual precision, he says, is as important as mathematical precision. I was not completely persuaded. Midway through the book, around p. 200, he finally offered his most detailed argument why definitions mattered. Hodgson makes a case that capitalism is more than just private property and markets, which have existed for hundreds, if not thousands, of years. Of crucial importance are the state and law, which make property "collateralizable" - i.e. property is the usual collateral for loans, which in Hodgson's eyes are the real motor of modern growth. So capitalism is not a timeless system, but a historical, conditional one (and it may not always be with us). Hodgson also spends considerable time making the case that too many economists have remained wedded to a "physicalist" notion of property, i.e. viewing roperty as stuff. Instead, drawing on the philosopher John Searle's ideas about collective intentionality and institutional facts, Hodgson wants us to reconceptualize property as an institutional or social fact - something we together believe in and, hence, make real. I think these are his main claims. To be honest, I stopped reading about halfway through. I found myself agreeing with his intellectual affiliations (institutional economics, evolutionary economics) and admiring his relentlessly independent judgment.

Richard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (1982)

I was already familiar with, and persuaded by, the general arguments in this book: orthodox economic theory makes many unrealistic assumptions, about maximizing behavior, perfect knowledge and rationality, highly competitive markets, static equilibria, competition occurring only over price, etc. Nonetheless, I still found this book extremely interesting and well-argued. The authors draw on work in many fields, including Michael Polanyi's ideas about "tacit knowledge" and organizational sociology and, of course, modern evolutionary thought, to offer a much more realistic picture of how individuals and firms behave than does orthodox economics. The book draws extensively on Joseph Schumpeter's ideas and tries to formalize them (I have to admit I couldn't follow the models and math and skipped these sections).The book has been enormously influential, having been cited more than 55,000 times. I wish I knew the lineaments of its influence - which arguments have been challenged, modified or further developed. Several years ago I read and greatly appreciated Robert Frank's more recent Darwin Economics, which made a generally similar argument (though I don't remember Frank's book in enough detail to say what the differences might be). Finally, as I read this book, I was struck by the parallels to Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson's Culture and the Evolutionary Process (1985), which came out just three years later and also proposed, and made a persuasive case for, an evolutionary approach to significant aspects of human history.

David Reich, Who We Are and How We Got Here: Ancient DNA and the New Science of the Human Past (2018)

This is a fascinating look at the new science of ancient DNA by one of the field's pioneers. In the 1980s the female mitochondrial and male Y chromosomes were first sequenced, followed in 2001 by the entire genome. 2010 was the breakthrough year for ancient DNA when Svante Paabo and colleagues at the Max Planck Institute in Leipzig first sequenced ancient Neanderthal DNA. Five years later, Reich's lab at Harvard built on Paabo's work to "industrialize" the sequencing of ancient DNA: by now thousands of ancient individuals' DNA going back more than 50,000 years and including "modern humans," Neanderthals, and species newly discovered by these techniques, including Denisovans and Homo Floriensis ("Hobbits"), have been analyzed. Interestingly, Reich says that the sequencing of the whole genome has not yet shed much light on the genetic sources of behavior. Given the fact that usually dozens of genes contribute to individual behaviors, Reich admits, it may never do so. However, whole genome sequencing, including of ancient individuals, has made a major, indeed revolutionary, contribution to the understanding of the deep human past. Reich thinks this revolution is so fundamental that is best grasped not by comparison with the dedoding of DNA by Crick and Watson in 1953; rather, it's more like the invention of the microscope in the seventeenth century: a whole new world is coming into view, much of it at odds with previously held theories. The mixing of modern humans and Neanderthals turns out to be much more complex than previously thought. Several "ghost populations" - no longer extant but the source of some contemporary populations - can be identified. A much more detailed, and radically new, picture of the peopling of Europe, India, the Americas, and East Asia has become possible. For example, ancient DNA has settled the debate about the origin of the earliest Indo-Europeans - they came from the Pontic steppe, not Anatolia. As they spread to the west, they merged with neolithic farming population, who in turn had merged with indigenous hunter-gatherers. The precise contribution of these three source-populations to contemporary Europeans can be measured. Something similar happened in India, where Reich's techniques have allowed him to identify the emergence of numerous endogamous populations - castes - starting around 2,000 years ago. Four distinct waves settled the Americas, one of which, however, remains hard to pin down. As Reich repeatedly acknowleged, ancient DNA is a rapidly developing field. Many of the results he included in his 2018 book will now have been modified, overturned, or superceded.

Angela Saini, The Patriarchs: The Origins of Inequality (2023)

Incoherent wishful thinking I read this for a reading group I've been in for the past 10 years. It's one of the worst books we've read. I'll start with some relatively minor (but still significant) flaws: 1) This reads like a piece of journalism blown up to 200 pages. Much of the book consists of Saini setting the scene of her encounters and quoting conversations with scholars rather than pointing to specific, more substantive evidence and scholarly arguments. 2) There are insinuations of gender biases in the literature (male scholars argue this way, female that) and of the role of European colonialism in spreading patriarchy to the rest of the world. These remain at the level of insinuation, so are never defended systematically. Some of Saini's own evidence undermines her own insinuations, especially in the case of Europe's impact (this is an instance of the incoherence I mentioned above; for more of which, see below). This is not to deny that European colonialism may in some cases have reinforced or changed patriarchy. I suspect this happened in smaller-scale societies, where patriarchy may not have existed already or been as entrenched. 3) Saini explains that her title - Patriarchs - is meant to acknowledge that there is no single thing patriarchy, just different versions of it. Yet repeatedly she discusses patriarchy precisely as a single thing. Furthermore, patriarchy, according to Saini, hasn't really diminished over time - a strange conclusion to anyone familiar with world history, especially in the last 100 or so years. 4) The greatest incoherence and wishful thinking occurs when it comes to Saini's central thesis. She argues that patriarchy is not at all rooted in biology, but rather took off when the state, needing growing populations, imposed rigid gender categories on their populations. But Saini's own evidence undermines her theses! She points to genetic bottlenecks that occurred before states formed as men who were successful in raiding and war were able to capture females and have lots of kids (this was one of the main rewards, and presumably drivers, of early warfare) while other men failed to reproduce. While she occasionally acknowledges these inconvenient facts (without, of course, recognizing how they simply don't dovetail with her the-state-launched-patriarchy thesis), she never wrestles with the extensive literature on the millenia of raiding and warfare before the state. Looking deeper in evolutionary time, Saini's treatment of human evolution is wholly inadequate. For example, she never discusses the fundamental evolutionary point that male and female mammals generally have different reproductive strategies - the former, whenever possible, favoring many offspring, the latter fewer and of higher quality. (These strategies don't apply at all times or under all circumstances, but they are a good starting point for explaining mammalian reproductive behavior). Saini never considers Richard Wrangham's influential work on male violence among the great apes (Demonic Males) or Bernard Chapais's on the evolution of pair bonding (Primeval Kinship). She mentions Christopher Boehm once, but does not explore the potential relevance of his ideas for the origins (and now decline) of patriarchy. Namely, Boehm argues that hunter-gatherers were not more egalitarian than chimpanzees because their individual desire to dominate had disappeared; rather HGs developed collective mechanisms to tame alpha males. Once agriculture happened, and population increased, however, those mechanisms broke down. The alphas were unleashed. My hunch is that this tracks what happened with patriarchy as well. And in recent times, of course, conditions have changed once again with industrialization, urbanization, democratization, modern communications. And the pendulum is swinging back the other way, toward equality. Boehm's explanation includes biological elements, but also an important role for circumstances of one kind or another.